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This is a plea for the adoption of the broad generalization laid down
in The Bold Buccleugh,' that all maritime liens, from whatever source
arising, are to be paid in the inverse order of their accrual. It was
said in that case that "This rule which is simple and intelligible, is in
our opinion applicable to all cases." Yet though The Bold Buccleugh
has been approved in principle both by the House of Lords2 and by
our own Supreme Court,3 the generalization logically deducible from
that principle has not been formally adopted by either of those high
tribunals. The result is that much uncertainty still exists in the deci-
sions and the textbooks as to the underlying principle controlling priori-
ties among maritime liens. An exception to the above generalization
should probably be made in favor of liens for mariners' wages, not
only for the traditional and sentimental reasons intimated in the John
G. Stevens,4 but on the more solid ground that such liens cannot be
treated as secret liens since everybody knows that mariners are not paid
in advance. Local rules for arbitrarily determining what liens for
supplies and repairs shall be deemed contemporaneous, and so of
equal rank, are also excepted. s
It would not be easy to trace with accuracy the development of the
modern law of maritime liens. The opinion of Mr. justice Curtis in
The Young Mechanic6 exhausts the subject of its relation to the Roman
Law. He points out that while the express hypothecation of the ship
by bottornry was recognized as creating a jus i i re, the privilege
or preference accorded to claims for advances to build, purchase, or
equip the ship, or to provide for necessary repairs and supplies in the
course of the voyage, was a mere personal privilege to be paid in
preference to general creditors. If that be so, the preference was
merely incidental to an equitable apportionment of the fund among
attaching creditors. On the other hand, the doctrine of tacit hypothe-
cation based on benefits conferred was well established and is appar-
ently as applicable to the building or repair of a ship as of a house; but
no doubt the weight of scholarship is in accord with the conclusion
expressed by the learned justice. Reddie says that the preference was
given inspection of priority in date, on the ground that such advances
preserved the fund for all creditors.7
I The Bold Buccleugh (85) 7 Moore, P. C. 267.
'Currie v. McKnight [1896] A. C. 97.
'The John G. Stevens (x898) 170 U. S. 113, I8,Sup. Ct. 544.
Supra note 3, at p. 119.
The forty day rule for harbor boats in New York harbor, the season of navi-
gation rule on the Great Lakes, and the ninety day rule in the Western District
of Washington.
(855, C. C. D. Me.) Fed. Cas. no. i8i8o.
"An Historical View of the Law of Maritime Commerce (84) 91.
[841]
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in the dark ages following the fall of Rome commercial law practi-
cally disappears from our sight, and when the revival of sea commerce
required a restatement of the maritime law, the prejudice against
secret liens on movables had imbedded itself so deeply into the local
law of England and of most European states that even the express
hypothecation of ships by bottomry was, for a time, excluded.8 In
the Rules of Oleron and the Laws of Wisly, a tacit hypothecation of
the ship is recognized for money borrowed in a foreign port, which
probably originated in the necessity of some device for giving the ship
credit in a foreign port, rather than from any conscious adoption of
the Roman doctrine of hypothecation. Such would seem to be the
explanation of Reddie's statement that express hypothecations by
bottomry and respondentia first reappear in the code of the Hanse
Towns.9 It is not necessary to this discussion to pursue any further
the development of the maritime lien on the continent.
In England the idea of jurisdiction over the ship founded upon
a pre-existing maritime lien seems not to have arisen until a later date.
Characteristically, it grew out of the procedure, and also out of the
attempt to put the Admiralty jurisdiction beyond the reach of writs
of prohibition issued by the Common Law courts. Its development
is stated by Jeune, J. in The Dictator,0 in Halsbury's Laws of Eng-
land,"' and by Maclachlan.- 2 From these it appears that the Admiralty
jurisdiction was first exercised by the arrest of the defendant as a mode
of compelling him to give bail for appearance and security. Then
the seizure of any of the defendant's property found in tidal waters
was substituted for the arrest of his person, and finally the seizure
became limited to the very ship in question. Up to this stage of its
development, the English maritime lien was merely a procedural
remedy. As to the origin of the idea that the seizure was for the pur-
pose of enforcing a pre-existing lien which had attached to the ship at a
place beyond the common law jurisdiction, Lord Halsbury says in a
note, "One opinion is that the source is to be found in the ancient law of
deodand, the ship being supposed to be itself responsible to the amount
of the claim against it (see Holmes, Common Law pp. 25-27) but the
more tenable theory would seem to be that the present law of maritime
lien has sprung from the Admiralty practise of arrest to compel
appearance and security."-s Of course, the courts of a country which
was once a province of Rome, and in whose Black Book of the Admi-
ralty the Rules of Oleron are inscribed, were not ignorant of the doc-
trine of hypothecatibn. As early as 1711 Lord Holt is reported as
8 I Ripert, Droit Maritime (2d ed. i92o) 20.
Reddie, op. cit. 255.[1892] P. 304, 311.
SVol. i, p. 6o.
"Law of Merchant Shipping (5th ed. IN11) 785.
"Vol. i, p. 61.
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saying, "By the maritime law every contract of the master implies
an hypothecation; but by the common law it is not so, unless it be so
expressly agreed."'14 Whatever may have been the course of its
development, there can be no doubt that the concept, which finally
emerged, of a jus in re expressly or tacitly created by contracts of the
master necessary to the completion of the voyage, was borrowed from
Rome.
Referring to our own law, Mr. Justice Curtis, in "The Young
Mechanic,"1 since approved by the Supreme Court,'6 identified the
maritime lien with Pothier's definition of hypothecation, and declared
it to be "The right which a creditor has in a thing of another, which
right consists in the power to cause that thing to be sold in order to
have the debt paid out of the price. This is a jus in re."
Thus, until within recent years, the maritime lien of the English and
American law was identified with Roman hypothec, despite the fact
that at the Roman law successive hypothecations, being primarily
intended solely for the security of the creditor, were for that reason
normally payable in the order of their priority. But since the master's
authority to hypothecate the ship, when necessary, is not chiefly for
the security of the creditor, but is primarily to give credit to the'ship
for the further prosecution of the voyage, it is necessary to give each
successive lienor a preference over all antecedent liens, of whose
existence and amount the creditor can have no knowledge, and no
means of information upon which he can safely rely. Before The
Bold Buccleugh was decided, this necessity for giving full credit to the
ship, whenever the necessity for hypothecation might arise, furnished,
I think, the true and only logically adequate reason for paying con-
tract liens in the inverse order of their priority in point of time. 7
However that may be, the old theory that contract liens were to be
marshalled on the basis of benefits conferred, as if maritime liens
were "in the nature of rewards for services rendered,"' 8 prevailed
and indeed still prevails. Such a theory of preference is manifestly
inapplicable to claims for damage done by a ship, and so when the
English Act of 184o gave back to their admiralty courts jurisdiction
in rem for damage done by ships, two new questions presented them-
selves, (i) whether the statute intended to impose a maritime lien on
the offending ship, and, if so, (2) upon what theory were such liens
" $wtin v. Bullar (1701, K. B.) i Salk. 34.
' Supra note 6, at p. 874.
"The I. E. Ruimbell (893) 148 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 498.
' "The vessel must get on; this is the consideration which controls every
other." St. Jago de Cuba (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 409. "It is essential that she
should be self-reliant,-that she should be able to obtain on her own account needed
repairs and supplies." Piednwnt Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. (192o) 254
U. S. I, 9; 41 Sup. Ct i 3.
The Hope (1873, Adm.) 28 L. T. 287.
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to be ranked in priority of payment, either as between successive liens
ex delicto, or with relation to contract liens. These questions
came to the Privy Council for decision in The Bold Buccleugh, and
Jervis, J., delivering judgment for the court, referred to The Aline,
decided by Dr. Lushington, saying, "In that case, there was a
bottomry bond before and after the collision, and the court held that
the claim for damage in a proceeding in rem must be preferred to the
'first bondholder, but was not entitled against the second bondholder
to the increased value of the vessel by reason of the repairs effected
at his cost. The interest of the first bondholder taking effect from
the period when his lien first attached, he was so to speak a part owner
in interest at the date of the collision, and the ship in which he and
others were interested was liable to its value at that date for the injury
done, without reference to his claim. So by the collision the inter-
est of the claimant attached, and dating from that event, the ship in
which he was interested having been repaired was put in bottomry
by the master acting for all parties, and he would be bound by that
transaction. This rule, which is simple and intelligible, is in our opin-
ion applicable in all cases."
It is apparent that this judgment marks a distinct step in the evolu-
tion of the modem concept of a maritime lien, for it lays down for the
first time, in the English law, the proposition that the right of property
conferred on the lienor by the maritime lien carries with it all the risks
attendant upon his part ownership in the vessel. And, if that be
accepted, it must follow, as the court says, that the rule is applicable
to all cases, and that his interest is subjected to every subsequent
lien. The rule of preference in payment is thus put upon the secure
basis of substantive law, as distinguished from remedial procedure.
In Currie v. McKnight2 ° Lord Watson said of The Bold Buccleugh,
"The principle of that decision has been accepted in the American
Courts; and in the Admiralty Courts of England it has for nearly
forty years been followed in a variety of cases in which lien for dam-
ages done by a ship has been preferred to claims for salvage and sea-
men's wages and upon bottomry bonds." In adopting and approving
the principle announced, our Supreme Court was even more specific
saying, "All the interests, existing at the time of the collision, in the
offending vessel, whether by way of part ownership, of mortgage,
of bottomry bond, or of other maritime lien for repairs or supplies,
arising out of contract with the owners or agents of the vessel, are
parts of the vessel itsel °a and as such are bound by and responsible
for her wrongful acts. Any one who had furnished necessary supplies
to the vessel before the collision, and had thereby acquired under our
law a maritime lien or privilege in the vessel herself, was, as was said
' (1798, Adm.) i Wm. Rob. iii.
2 oSupra note 2.
"a Italics are those of the present writer.
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in The Bold Buccleugh, before cited, of the holder of an earlier bot-
tonmry bond under the law of England, so to speak, a part owner in
interest at the date of the collision, and the ship in which he and others
were interested was liable to its value at that date for the injury alone,
without reference to his claim." 2' True the Supreme Court was
dealing in that case with the particular instance of the priority of a later
lien ex delicto over a lien ex contractu and, following its tradition,
limited its decision to the case before it. But the principle that liens
ex contractu "are parts of the vessel itself," is equally applicable to
liens ex delicto, for it rests upon the nature of the interest acquired
by the lienor, and not upon the transaction out of which the particular
lien arose. That must be so unless there is more than one kind of a
maritime lien, which is unheard of. Besides, it will be remembered
that The Bold BUccleugh applied the almost self-evident proposition
that a proprietary interest is subject to the ordinary risks of ownership,
to three successive liens arising from bottomry, collisions and bottomry.
It is submitted that The John G. Stevens authorizes, and indeed logically
establishes the broad generalization laid down in The Bold Buccleugh.
Such a simplification of the law governing the priority of maritime
liens is much needed. The main current of authority is drifting slowly
toward the doctrine of paying all maritime liens in the inverse order
of their attachment, but much confusion of principle and authority
still exists. This confusion results from the persistence of a complex
of inadequate and more or less inconsistent theories. Some of them
represent past stages in the gradual development of the concept of
the lien. Thus the attempt to marshal liens according to benefits
conferred corresponds roughly to the stage where the lien was treated
as a procedural remedy, and the proceeds of the ship as a fund to be
distributed equitably among attaching creditors. It takes two forms,
one of which classifies liens in the order of their supposed inherent
merit ;22 the other, and more commonly accepted, gives preference
to that lien which has most immediately preserved or enhanced the
common security. Neither of these rules is applicable to tort liens;
in fact they originated in England at a time when the admiralty
jurisdiction in rem for damage done by a ship was prohibited. The
first is quite inconsistent with the original purpose of the maritime
lien, i. e., to give the ship credit for any emergency in a foreign port.
If it were generally adopted in the maritime law, no more money
could be borrowed on bottomry, which is always placed at the bottom
of the list. The second works well enough as applied to contract
liens, for it generally pays them in the inverse order of their attach-
ment, but it sometimes fails to justify its equitable pretensions, as
when the entire fund is swallowed at one gulp by the latest benefactor.
Other theories of priority are drawn from maxims of the civil codes.
' The John G. Stevens, supra note 3, at p. 123.
'226 Cyc. 8o5-6; Hughes, Admiralty (09o) 331.
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such as "Maritime liens are adjusted by the voyage," and "The cargo
is bound to the ship and the ship to the cargo ;" and these have often
been applied without reference to the fact that in our law they are only
half true, or have been stretched beyond their proper significance. 23
The uncertain rule of laches is also invoked to settle priorities between
conflicting liens. As to tort liens no guiding rule at all existed until
the proprietary nature of the lien vis interest was established here
by The John G. Stevens; for the commonly accepted fiction that the
ship itself is the wrongdoer, threw no light at all upon the rank of
tort liens in the scale of priority.24
It was not to be expected that a large number of independent District
Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction should succeed in developing any con-
sistent body of law out of such a mess of rules. True, conditions
have improved since Judge Brown said in 188o, "it is scarcely too
much to say that each court is a law unto itself" ;25 yet in 1915 the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after struggling with
the inherent merit rule, the voyage rule, the rule of laches and the forty
day rule, quoted from The Panthea26 a reference "to the confusion in
which the whole subject of the priority of liens is involved," and from
The City of Tawas the statement that "the subject of marshalling
liens in admiralty is one which is unfortunately left in great obscurity
by the authorities.1 2
7
Such obscurity as remains is wholly unnecessary. A recognition of
the proprietary nature of the interest created by maritime liens, as
established in The Bold Buccleugh and The John G. Stevens sweeps
away all imaginary difficulties and substitutes a rule which is simple
and intelligible and applicable to all cases.28
The ship mortgage act of June 5, 1920,29 authorizes the creation of
a new species of maritime lien by "preferred mortgages." Upon the
sale of any mortgaged vessel in any suit in rem for the enforcement
of a preferred mortgage the statute assigns to such lien a definite
intermediate position in the scale of priority. In any case in which the
lien of such a mortgage is sought to be enforced against the proceeds
in competition with other maritime liens, the rule of inverse priority
nust be subject to the statutory exceptions.
'For recent examples see The Nissegoque (1922, E. D. N. C.) 280 Fed. 174,
192-3. The St. Paul (1921, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 99.
24 Is not the tort lien a necessary corollary of the doctrine of limited liability,
under which the owners may escape personal liability at will?
The City of Tawas (i88o, E. D. Mich.) 3 Fed. 17o.
(,871, Adm.) 25 L. T. 389.
The Samuel Little (191s. C. C. A. 2d) 22 Fed. 308, 319-20.
At least one District judge has recognized and applied the principle established
by The John G. Stevens, but the case has apparently never been cited. The
America (io9, D. N. J.) 168 Fed. 424.
" Act of June 5, 192o (41 Stat. at L. 988) ; the act Was held constitutional in
The Oconee (1922, E. D. Va.) 28o Fed. 927; see COmmENTS (1924) 33 YALE
LAW JoulRAL, 646.
